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In the preceding sectionswe have described the changes in the
banking structure effected by theNazi government to help finance
its military program, and themethods and techniques applied in
raising funds through taxes, borrowing,and miscellaneous revenues.
While it was possible to trace witha certain degree of accuracy the
structural developments in the financialsystem of Nazi Germany.
it is much more difficultto secure reliable and comprehensive in-
formation about the actualoperation of that system. Thenearer we
get to the immediate past, the largerare the gaps in the statistical
material and the greater the difficultiesin interpreting it. In onlya
very few instances do wepossess statistical series whichcover th
entire ten-year period that hasnow elapsed since the beginning of
German war preparations. Inaddition, the figures thatare available
become less and lesscomparable since theircoverage changes and
since we are not ableto make necessary adjustments.Because Nazi
Germany began incorporatingforeign territories into theReich in
1935, the consistency of statistical timeseries has been destroyed in
many instances. We hardly needto mention that these difficulties
multiply with the outbreak ofwar when Germany started toover-
run many European countries. "Animportant factor during 1940,"
says the Bank for International Settlements,'7"was the extension
of the banks' businessto incorporated and occupiedterritories."
And the London and CambridgeEconomic Service stated in July
1943 in discussing Gennan financialstatistics that "it is not always
clear how far recent Germanfigures refer to thearea including the
incorporated parts of France,Belgium, Poland andYugoslavia or
to the 1939 frontiers."148 Hence thereader may well appreciate
how difficult it is to interpretthe changes that havetaken place
in banks' deposits,or note circulation, orgovernment securities
owned by banks.
There is another problem thatshould be mentioned. Figureson
financial conditions in Germanyno longer have the significance
which similar statistics have ina traditional capitalisteconomy. In
an economic system as completely dominatedand planned by the
147 Eleventh Annual Report (1941)p. 115.































government and asthoroughly regulated by directcontrols as the
Nazi economy, anincrease in the public debt.orchanges in the
balance sheets ofbanks have lost much of the importanceusually
attached to them.While they still register performancesin the
economy, they nolonger operate as major barometersand guides to
the government.Since all significant decisions toproduces invest,
and consume aremade in the light of minutestatistics of available
resources andpotentialities, indications offinancial developments
no longer servethe purposes that they fulfillin an economy based
on thetraditional market mechanism.
Since the time has notyet come to make anexhaustive study of
developments in the moneyand capital marketsduring the Nazi
regimes we shall have tolimit ourselves toindicating in broad out-
line the effectsof government expenditure oncentral and com-
mercial banking.Although the informationwhich has becomeavafl-
able is scanty andincomplete it throws someinteresting light on the
development ofNazi war finance. Notonly does it portraythose
characteristics of wartimebanking that on thewhole are common
to allbelligerent countries_increasein deposits. notecirculation
and bank holdingsof government paperbutit suggests someaddi-
tional observations.
THE REICHSBANK
Two developments arecharacteristic of the Germanmoney and
capital markets bothbefore and duringthe war: theincreasingly
large use of centralbank credit to covergovernmentexpenditure
and the exploitationof all the resourcesof the creditmechanism for
the same purpose.The reader mayrecall our discussionabout the
changes in bankinglegislation in the prewarperiod of the Nazi
regime. Weemphasized that most ofthese changes weremade in
view of thegovernment's jfltcntiofl toprepare for warand to adapt
the banking system tothe financialrequirements of amilitary con-
flict. This, we said, wasparticularlY true ofthe "reform"of the
Reichsbank Law. Thedevelopment of theReichsbaflk'S statusbears
out ourinterpretation (Charti). The Reichsbaflkbecame the solid
basis upon whichGerman war financehas beenoperating. The pro-
vision enabling theReichsbank to usegovernment obligationsin
unlimited amounts as coverfor the noteswith which they were




















301K, the credit system " for the Reichsbank could purchase at any time
any amount of government paper that the public and the banks were
not willing or able to buy. And the Reichsbank was compelled to
make increasing use of that provision.
Even in the very early years of war preparation, the Reichsbank
took active part in financing armament expenditure. By the end of
the total amount of hills held by the Central Bankwhich
were to a large extent Treasury bills or government-guaranteed
paperwas more than twice as much as its holdings in bills in the
boom years before the 1929 depression when the Reichsbank port-
folio consisted largely of commercial paper. After 1937, the Reichs-
bank "bill" portfolio grew at an accelerated pace. From the outbreak
of war until December 1943, the Reichsbank gained over o billion
reichsmarks in bills of all types (the "bills" were chiefly government
paper'50) while its note tirculation grew by about 23 billion during
the same period. By the end of 1943, the Reichsbank held in its
portfolio about 20 percent of the entire Reich debt, an indication of
how important the purchase of government paper by the Central
Bank had become for the financing of the war. Taking the decade
of the Nazi regime since 1933 as a whole, the figures on Reichsbank
holdings of government paper are an interesting corollary to the
available information about German expenditure for military pur-
poses presented in tile next section. TheReichsbank statistics offer
an illustration that German militarypreparations gained momen-
tum beginning in i7. The total amount ofbills held by the
Reichsbank more than trebled in the seven years from tile end of
1932 until the outbreak of war; and itincreased four times in the
next four and a half years, from the beginning of waruntil the end
of 1943.
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Since publication of official banking statistics was greatlycurtailed
ifl1939,151information on the effect of government expenditure
upon commercial banking does notexist for the entire period of
the Nazi regime. The only available data coveringthe development
149 This mechanism For government borrowing which the ReichsbankAct of 1924
deliberately sought to prevent, resembles very much the systemused during the last
war and in the inflationary period until the fallof 1925.
'50League oF Nations, Money and Banking19.39-la, Vol. I, p. 52.
151League of Nations, Money and Banking 1910-42, p.118.
69S
from 1933 to the end of1942 refer merely to the "Big Five," 152wliich
were the five leading banks inBerlin, leaving out themany other banks in thecountry. The increase ingovernment paper and in
deposits of these five bankswas very small until the outbreak ofwar. Although their "bill"portfolios contained increasingamounts of various types ofgovernmentguaranteed bills instead ofcommercial paper, the leading banks donot seem to have helped agreat deal in financing warpreparation directly. This changed,however, with the
outbreak of hostilities. Sincethe beginning ofwar until the end of
1942, the deposits of the five leadingbanks more than doubledand their holdings ingovernment paper increased about fivetimes. (See Chart 2.) We haveno way of knowing whether thechange in assets
and liabilities of the"Big Five" may beconsidered a fair indication of the trend ofdevelopments in allcommercial banks after1939. We know, however, thatbefore ig, startilig almostwith the begin. fling of the Naziregime,'both deposits and holdingsin govern-
ment securities andgovernment.guarantec paper by allcommercial banks, including the"Big Five," increasedconsiderably more than in the "Big Five"alone. Goinga step further and including also
the many other banksthat existed in Germany,such as Girozen-
tralen, state and provincialbanks, workers banks,agricultural banks, land banks and savingsbanks, we will find'5that the share in the prewar debt of thegovernment, which was not placedwith either the public or the insurancecompanies, was considerably largerthan the Statistics on"commercial" bankingsuggest. For the period after the outbreak ofwar, we know froman official source that about
four-fifths of the increasein the short.term debtfrom September
'g3q to the end of 1941 was placed withthe bankingsystem (includ. ing the Reichsbank)and that thepercentage of long-termpaper bought during thesame period by the entirecredit apparatus (in. cluding savings banksand insurance institutions)was not much smal ler.'6
The Statisticson Nazi banking just described,however incomplete they may be, make itclear that thegovernment war expenditure
l&2 Deutsche Bank, DresdnerBank, Commera. und PrivatBank, Rejchj-iJh. Ceseflschaft. Berliner Handels-Ceselfschaft
153 League of Nations, Moneyand Ranking 1938-39, Vol.11, p. 91. '5Ibid.,pp.82-88.






































CHART 2 PRiNCIPAL Assrs AND LABJL1TIES OF TUE "BIG FIVE"






Source: Appendix Table 2.
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942was met to an increasingly large degree throughfunds provided
by the manifold agencies of thecredit system. Since we knowof the
government's efforts ever since the early daysof war preparationto
reserve the resources of the money and capitalmarket as muchas
possible for itself, the question mightwell be asked whether andto
what extent credit institutionswere able (or permitted) during
those years to satisfy financialneeds of the country outsidegovern-
tnent requirements. All the informationavailable on thisscore,
which is as incompleteas any other statistical material about bank-
ing, tends to show that thesignificance of the bankingsystem has
changed greatly in providing fundsfor its privatecustomers. The
information on the holdings ofcommercial bills by banks is exceed-
ingly poor and inconclusive.However, it is frequentlysuggested in
pertinent literature thatcommercial bills have become lessand less
significant in the banks' portfolios.There is no doubt that,to put
it very carefully, theiramount, if anything, has not risen.156Similar
evidence exists about loansmade by banks to their privatecus-
tomers. The total amount ofcommercial loans and advancesmade
by all commercial banksremained almost stagnant duringthe period
of war preparations and increasedslightly in the last fewmonths
before the outbreak ofwar. Information for the waryears is again
available only for the five leadingBerlin banks. In thiscase, how-
ever, they may be considered fairlyrepresentative for commercial
banking as a whole. Thetotal amount of commercialloans re-
mained about stable during the firsttwo years of war. Then, how-
ever, the situation started to change. Thetotal of commercial loans
increased rather considerably in1942. Many pieces of information
tend to show that private enterprisethen found it more difficultthan
during the many previousyears to self-finance both new investment
and the needs of daily transactions,and was compelled toappeal to
the money market and alsoto the capital market. We donot know
whether there has beena further development in this directiondur-
ing 1943 and whether the changejust described hasany specific sig-
nificance for Nazi war financeas a whole.
The Nazi government has beenvery anxious throughout the
years of its regime to reduce therates of interest for the various
























































































































































































































































.types of loans and issues. Thiswas done partly for ideological and
political reasons, partlyto limit the government's cost infinancing the war. It was admittedeven by official Nazi sources'57 that there- duction of interestrates, continued during thewar years, had no
significance upon the size ofthe credit volume in theeconomy; it
rather illustrated "thedesire of the Reichsbankto maintain its easy
money policy and wasa programmatic demonstration of itsfunda- mental attitude on the interestrate problem." Sincewe have dis- cussed that policy ingreater detj1 before, it will sufficehere to call attention to themovement of interest rates shown inChartand to emphasize their limitedsignificance for an economicanalysis of Nazi war finance.
1TWochenberj des Deugsche!n.ctigugsfür Wirtschaftsforschung Vol.15 (1942) p.32.
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